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This paper analyzes the welfare costs of business cycles when workers face uninsurable idiosyncratic labor
income risk. In accordance with the previous literature, this paper decomposes labor income risk into an
aggregate and an idiosyncratic component, but in contrast to the previous literature, this paper allows for
multiple sources of idiosyncratic labor income risk. Using the multi-dimensional approach to idiosyncratic
risk, this paper provides a general characterization of the welfare cost of business cycles when preferences
and the (marginal) process of individual labor income in the economy with business cycles are given. The
general analysis shows that the introduction of multiple sources of idiosyncratic risk never decreases the
welfare cost of business cycles, and strictly increases it if there are cyclical ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent
sources of risk. Finally, this paper also provides a quantitative analysis of multi-dimensional labor income
risk based on a version of the model that is calibrated to match U.S. labor market data. The quantitative
analysis suggests that realistic variations across two particular dimensions of idiosyncratic labor income risk
increase the welfare cost of business cycles by a substantial amount.
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In a highly inﬂuential contribution, Lucas (1987) argues that the welfare costs of business
cycles are likely to be very small, and that therefore the potential gains from counter-cyclical
stabilization policy are negligible. His argument is based on a representative-agent model
with no production and “standard” preferences. In other words, Lucas (1987) assumes that
i) there is no uninsurable risk (complete markets), ii) there is no link between business
cycles and economic growth, and iii) preferences allow for a time-additive expected utility
representation with moderate degree of (relative) risk aversion. In principle, any one of
these three assumptions could be questioned, and it is therefore important to know how
relaxing any one of them will change the welfare conclusions.1 This paper analyzes to what
extent the introduction of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk (incomplete markets)
increases the welfare cost of business cycles. In order to disentangle the complete-markets
assumption from the other two assumptions made in Lucas (1987), the analysis presented
in this paper is based on a model with standard preferences and no link between business
cycles and economic growth.
There is strong empirical evidence that idiosyncratic labor income risk varies over the
business cycle.2 If risk-averse agents dislike variations in idiosyncratic risk, then this obser-
vation suggests a channel through which market incompleteness might increase the welfare
cost of business cycles.3 A growing body of work has studied the quantitative importance
1For example, Lucas (2003) argues that this type of analysis constitutes one of the main macroeconomic
priorities.
2Clearly, the job displacement rate and the unemployment duration increase during recessions (Hall,
1995). Furthermore, the magnitude of permanent income losses of displaced workers depends on cyclical
conditions (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993), and the business cycle has an eﬀect on the placement
success of initial labor market entrants. Finally, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), and to a certain
extent also Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), ﬁnd that the variance of persistent income shocks is highly sensitive
to business cycle conditions.
3Another possible channel is the interaction between aggregate productivity shocks and idiosyncratic
1of this channel ﬁnding mostly modest eﬀects.4 In his recent review of the literature Lucas
(2003) therefore concludes: “But I argue in the end that, based what we know now, it is un-
realistic to hope for gains larger than a tenth of a percent from better countercyclical policy”.
In this paper, we introduce multiple sources (dimensions) of idiosyncratic labor income risk,
and show that this innovation has the potential to generate welfare cost of business cycles
that are substantially larger than one tenth of a percent of lifetime consumption.
The previous literature has commonly decomposed individual labor income risk into an
aggregate and an idiosyncratic component, and has further assumed that the idiosyncratic
component is represented by a one-dimensional variable. In this paper, we also decompose
individual labor income risk into an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component, but in con-
trast to the previous literature we allow for multiple sources of idiosyncratic labor income
risk. Using the multi-dimensional approach to idiosyncratic risk, this paper ﬁrst provides
a general characterization of the welfare cost of business cycles when preferences and the
(marginal) process of individual income in the economy with business cycles are given. The
general analysis shows that the introduction of multiple sources of idiosyncratic risk never
decreases the welfare cost of business cycles, and strictly increases it if there are cyclical
ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent dimensions of idiosyncratic risk. In other words, this paper
derives lower and upper bounds on the welfare cost of business cycles, and shows that the
case of one-dimensional idiosyncratic risk leads to the minimum welfare cost of business
shocks due to the non-linearity of the utility function (risk-aversion). However, Krebs (2003a) ﬁnds that
this interaction eﬀect tends to be relatively small. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) ﬁnd a larger
interaction eﬀect, but they use a higher degree of risk aversion.
4For example, Atkeson and Phelan (1994) suggest that the welfare cost of business cycles might be nil,
Krusell and Smith (1999) ﬁnd only negligible eﬀects, and Imrohoroglu (1989) and Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2001) ﬁnd non-negligible, but relatively modest eﬀects (at least for degrees of risk aversion around
one). Further, Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) suggest that business cycles might have positive
welfare eﬀects. More recently, Krebs (2003a) provides an example where the welfare cost of business cycles
is large, and Krusell and Smith (2002) ﬁnd substantial costs for some groups of agents, even though the net
eﬀect on welfare for the entire population is small. See also Lucas (2003) for a recent survey of the literature.
2cycles.5
There is a simple economic intuition why additional dimensions of idiosyncratic risk
increase the welfare costs of business cycles when there are cyclical ﬂuctuations across the
diﬀerent sources of idiosyncratic risk. Consider, for example, the case in which the labor
income of an individual worker is determined by the random returns to his endowment of
two diﬀerent skill (human capital) types.6 Suppose further that the ﬁrst skill is only useful
during economic booms and the second skill is only useful during recessions. In this case, an
individual household working in the economy with business cycles receives a labor income
that at each point in time is determined by the random return to one skill only, whereas
after the elimination of business cycles the same household receives a labor income that at
each point in time is determined by a weighted average of two random returns.7 Clearly,
in this case the elimination of business cycles leads to a reduction in the amount of labor
income risk the individual household has to bear, and this risk-reduction eﬀect is absent in
any one-dimensional model of labor income risk. Thus, introducing multiple dimensions of
idiosyncratic risk and allowing for cyclical ﬂuctuations across dimensions of risk leads to the
conclusion that the welfare costs of business cycles are likely to be higher than suggested by
5Notice that welfare of workers depends on preferences and the marginal process of individual income
only, and that throughout the entire analysis we ﬁx preferences and the marginal process of individual income
in the economy with business cycles. Thus, the introduction of multi-dimensional idiosyncratic risk changes
the welfare cost of business cycles because it changes welfare in the economy without business cycles (keeping
welfare in the economy with business cycles constant). This result holds even though business cycles are
eliminated in accordance with the integration principle (Krusell and Smith, 1999, and equation 10).
6Note that any Mincer-type wage regression (Mincer, 1974) implicitly makes the assumption that the labor
income of a worker is composed of individual components that reﬂect the return to diﬀerent dimensions of
human capital. Notice also that a similar argument applies when skill returns are constant, but skill-levels
evolve stochastically over time (for example, loss of speciﬁc human capital in the event of job displacement).
7This is an application of the integration principle as ﬁrst proposed by Krusell and Smith (1999). Atkeson
and Phelan (1994) suggest that the elimination of business cycles amounts to eliminating any correlation
across individual income shocks. If the independence assumption is satisﬁed (equation 15), then the appli-
cation of the integration principle removes any correlation across individual income shocks (for details, see
the discussion following proposition 2).
3the previous literature.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, this paper also provides a numerical analysis based
on a version of the model calibrated to U.S. data. In this quantitative part, we compute the
welfare cost of business cycles as a function of one parameter, which measures the degree
to which the economy with business cycles exhibits cyclical ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent
dimensions of idiosyncratic labor market risk. Depending on the particular value of this
one parameter, the welfare cost of business cycles could be anything between 0.3 (the one-
dimensional case) and 9 percent of lifetime consumption (for log-utility preferences). That is,
the introduction of multi-dimensional idiosyncratic risk has the potential to generate welfare
cost of business cycles that are quite large indeed.
The preceding discussion highlights that it is not multi-dimensionality per se that in-
creases the welfare cost of business cycles, but the cyclical ﬂuctuations across diﬀerent di-
mensions of risk. Thus, a natural question to ask is whether the U.S. labor market exhibits
cyclical ﬂuctuations of this type, and whether these ﬂuctuations are substantial enough to
generate sizable welfare cost of business cycles. Clearly, there are in principle many ap-
proaches to investigating this issue empirically, but one approach that seems particularly
promising is the following. First, identify particular dimensions of human capital of individ-
ual workers and their empirical counterparts, say speciﬁc human capital (proxied by tenure
at a ﬁrm) and general human capital (proxied by education). Second, estimate that part
of total labor income risk that can be attributed to each individual component of human
capital. Third, use these estimates to ﬁnd the cyclical ﬂuctuations across the individual
dimensions of human capital risk. In this paper, we do not attempt to conduct a full-blown
empirical analysis along these lines, but instead provide some preliminary evidence that is
based on recently obtained empirical results on permanent labor income risk (Meghir and
Pistaferri, 2004) and insights derived from the literature on Mincer-type wage regressions
4(Mincer, 1974). This preliminary analysis suggests that the U.S. labor market exhibits cycli-
cal variations across two particular dimensions of human capital risk (speciﬁc and general
human capital) that lead to welfare cost of business cycles around 1.5 percent of lifetime con-
sumption (for log-utility preferences). Clearly, this particular quantitative result is highly
tentative, and much more empirical work on the issue of cyclical ﬂuctuations across dimen-
sions of human capital risk is required to arrive at ﬁrm conclusions. However, the result
indicates that the multi-dimensional view of labor market risk is likely to generate welfare
cost of business cycles that are signiﬁcantly larger than what has been suggested by the
previous literature.
At this stage, it is worth pointing out that the results reported here do not imply that
macroeconomic stabilization policy necessarily leads to substantial welfare gains. More
speciﬁcally, this paper does not explicitly model how counter-cyclical ﬁscal or monetary
policy might aﬀect the business cycle (the cyclical nature of idiosyncratic labor market risk),
and it is therefore not well-suited for studying the question whether policy makers can de-
sign macroeconomic policies that stabilize the business cycle.8 Moreover, this paper only
focuses on one channel through which the business cycle might aﬀect welfare, and the wel-
fare calculation presented here are therefore necessarily incomplete. For example, there are
many ways in which business cycles aﬀect aggregate output (growth), and this paper rules
out any such output-eﬀect by assumption. Thus, the welfare results derived here have to
be interpreted with caution keeping these limitations in mind. In short, this paper does not
show that macroeconomic stabilization policy is desirable, but it does show that our current
knowledge of idiosyncratic labor market risk is not suﬃcient to rule out large welfare costs
of business cycles.
Finally, a comment regarding modeling strategy is in order. In the spirit of Lucas (1987),
8This type of “black-box” approach is common in the literature on the welfare cost of business cycles.
5this paper attempts to analyze the welfare cost of business cycles keeping the mean of
aggregate output ﬁxed.9 Given this restriction, one approach would be to use preferences
and estimates of the process of individual consumption risk to derive the welfare cost of
business cycles. One problem with this approach is that the empirical literature has mainly
focused on cyclical variations in individual income risk.10 Put diﬀerently, we know much more
about cyclical variations in individual income risk than we know about cyclical variations in
individual consumption risk. Thus, for the quantitative application, it is necessary to have a
model that translates income shocks into consumption ﬂuctuations. The model used in this
paper is an exchange economy with only permanent income shocks as in Constantinides and
Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2004). This model has the advantage that it is highly tractable,
but still rich enough to allow for a tight link between the theoretical model and the empirical
literature on labor income risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the model that is used to discuss
the eﬀect of multi-dimensional risk on the welfare cost of business cycles. Section III dis-
cusses how to eliminate business cycles in economies with incomplete markets and derives a
closed-form expression for the welfare cost of business cycles. Section IV contains the main
results. More speciﬁcally, section IV.A provides a general characterization of the welfare cost
of business cycles, and shows that the introduction of multi-dimensional idiosyncratic risk
increases the welfare cost of business cycles if there are cyclical variations across the diﬀerent
9This is not to say that an analysis of the relationship between business cycles and long-run output growth
is unimportant. However, keeping the mean of the level and growth rate of aggregate output ﬁxed allows us
to focus on the issue of multi-dimensional risk in a simple and transparent manner. Moreover, several links
between business cycles and the mean of aggregate output (growth) have been suggested in the literature
(see Lucas, 2003, for a survey), and no clear consensus has yet emerged as to which mechanism is the most
important one.
10There is, however, some recent empirical work that discusses the asset pricing implications of cyclical
variations in individual consumption risk (for example, Brav, Constantinides, and Gescy, 2002). One well-
known problem with the consumption approach is that the currently available individual consumption data
are either limited to food consumption (PSID) or lack a suﬃcient panel dimension (CEX).
6dimensions of idiosyncratic risk. Section IV.B conducts the quantitative analysis based on a
calibrated version of the model. Section IV.C provides some preliminary evidence suggest-
ing that the U.S. labor market is characterized by substantial cyclical variations across two
particular dimensions of idiosyncratic labor market risk. Section V concludes.
II. Model
As mentioned before, the model is similar to the model considered in Constantinides
and Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2004). It features ex-ante identical, long-lived households
(workers) with homothetic preferences that make consumption/saving choices in the face of
uninsurable income shocks. Income shocks are permanent, which implies that self-insurance
is an ineﬀective means to smooth out income ﬂuctuations. Indeed, the economy is set up in
a way so that in equilibrium households will not self-insure at all. That is, income shocks
translate one-to-one into consumption changes (proposition 1). Notice that this result does
not depend on the assumption that aggregate saving is zero, even though we will make it
to simplify the analysis. For example, Krebs (2003a,2003b) considers a production economy
with only permanent income shocks (log-income follows a random walk) and ex-ante identical
households, and shows again that self-insurance is highly ineﬀective.11
11In the current model, there is no production and no asset in positive net supply, so that in equilibrium
all households end up with zero wealth. Thus, a stationary cross-sectional distribution of wealth exists,
even though it is degenerate. Once we introduce assets in positive net supply (Constantinides and Duﬃe,
1996, and Krebs, 2004) or physical capital and production (Krebs 2003a,b), the cross-sectional distribution
of wealth will diverge since individual wealth (approximately) follows a logarithmic random walk. However,
Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) show how to modify the model by introducing death probabilities so that
a stationary distribution of wealth always exists. Indeed, they show that by choosing the death probabilities
appropriately, the model can match any cross-sectional distribution of wealth. Huggett (1996) discusses the
wealth distribution in life-cycle economies, and Castanedas, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003) analyze the
wealth distribution in economies that mix the features of life-cycle models and dynastic models.
7II.A. Economy
Time is discrete and open ended. Labor income of household i in period t is denoted by
yit. Labor income is random and deﬁned by an initial level yi0 and the law of motion
yi,t+1 =( 1+ηi,t+1)yit , (1)
where the random variable ηi,t+1 describe shocks to the labor income of worker i.
We make the following assumptions about the process of individual labor income deﬁned
by (1). We assume that ηit = η(sit,S t), where sit denotes a vector of idiosyncratic shocks
to the income of worker i and St the aggregate state of the economy. We assume further
that the joint process {sit,S t} is Markov with transition probabilities π(si,t+1,S t+1|sit,S t)
satisfying
π(si,t+1,S t+1|sit,S t)=π(si,t+1,S t+1|St) . (2)
In short, conditional on the history of aggregate states, idiosyncratic labor income shocks are
identically distributed across workers and independently distributed over time (idiosyncratic
shocks are unpredictable).
Speciﬁcation (1) in conjunction with our assumption that idiosyncratic shocks are unpre-
dictable implies that, conditional on the aggregate state, the growth rate of individual labor
income is unpredictable. Using the approximation log(1 + x) ≈ x, equation (1) yields:
logyi,t+1 = logyit + ηi,t+1 . (3)
That is, log-labor income approximately follows a random walk. Clearly, depending on
the speciﬁcation of the function η(.), this random walk might exhibit state-dependent drift
and a heteroscedastic error term. This shows that the idiosyncratic labor income shocks
discussed in this paper correspond to permanent shocks to labor income, and explains why
self-insurance does not work very well in the current model. Moreover, when calibrating
8the model, one should focus on the permanent component of labor income risk as estimated
by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Storesletten et al. (2004) for total labor income and
by Jacobson et al. (1993) for income losses due to job displacement. See the quantitative
section IV.B for more details on this.
Each household begins life with no initial ﬁnancial wealth. Households have the oppor-
tunity to buy and sell short-lived securities j =1 ,...,J in zero net supply. The sequential
budget constraint of worker i reads
cit + Qt · ai,t+1 = yit + Dt · ait (4)
Qt · ai,t+1 ≥− M,a i0 =0.
Here cit denotes consumption of household i in period t , ait =( ai1t,...,a iJt) his vector of
asset holdings at the beginning of period t, Dt =( D1t,...,D Jt) the vector of asset payoﬀs,
and Qt =( Q1t,...,Q Jt) the vector of asset prices. The budget constraint (4) simply says
that total spending on consumption and assets is equal to total income from labor and asset
holdings (capital). The real number M represents an explicit debt constraint that rules out
Ponzi schemes (Krebs, 2004). We assume that asset payoﬀs may depend on the aggregate
state, but not on idiosyncratic shocks: Dt = D(St). Thus, asset markets are incomplete
in the sense that they do not provide explicit insurance against idiosyncratic labor income
risk. Notice that we allow one of the assets, say the ﬁrst, to be risk-free, in which case the
asset payoﬀs are state-independent: D1(St) = 1. Thus, households have the opportunity to
self-insure through saving, even though in equilibrium they will not do so.
Households have identical preferences that allow for a time-additive expected utility rep-
resentation:
U({cit})=E






Moreover, we assume that the one-period utility function, u,i sg i v e nb yu(c)=c1−γ
1−γ ,γ =1 ,
or u(c)=logc, that is, preferences exhibit constant degree of relative risk aversion γ. Finally,
9we assume that the following condition is satisﬁed:
βE
 
(1 + η(si,t+1,S t+1))
1−γ |St
 
< 1 . (6)
This inequality ensures that in equilibrium the expected lifetime utility of workers is ﬁnite
for any budget-feasible plan, and that any solution to the Euler equation also solves a corre-
sponding transversality condition (Krebs, 2004). Notice that this condition is automatically
satisﬁed if γ = 1 (log-utility).
II.2. Equilibrium
For a given process of asset prices and asset payoﬀs, each household chooses a consumption-
saving plan that maximizes expected lifetime utility (5) subject to the budget constraint (4).




Notice that (4) and (7) imply goods market clearing (Walras’ law). We now show that there
is an asset price process for which the plan ait =0a n dcit = yit is individually optimal.
That is, there is an asset price process for which workers choose to consume all their income
in every period. Since this plan also satisﬁes the market clearing condition (7), it is an
equilibrium.
The Euler equations associated with the consumption-saving problem of household i read
c
−γ







i =( si0,...,s it)a n dSt =( S0,...,S t) is the information that is available to household
i in period t. The Euler equation (8) says that the marginal utility cost of buying (saving)
12The notation suggests that there are a ﬁnite number of households, but all propositions in this paper
remain valid for the case of a continuum of households.
10one more unit of asset j is equal to the expected marginal utility gain of doing so. In Krebs
(2004) it is shown that any plan solving the Euler equation (8) and the budget constraint
(4) also satisﬁes a corresponding transversality condition if (6) is satisﬁed. Thus, we can
focus on Euler equations when discussing optimal consumption/saving plans.











where the individual labor income growth rate yi,t+1/yit is given by (1). Given these asset
prices, the Euler equation (8) is satisﬁed. Since for ait = 0 the market clearing condition
(7) holds, we have found an equilibrium. Notice that we have used the fact that st
i does not
predict future income growth. Without this assumption, the Euler equation (8) would not
hold at ait =0a n dcit = yit.
Proposition 1. The consumption-saving plan {ait,c it},w h e r eait =0a n dcit = yit,i n
conjunction with asset prices (9) constitute an equilibrium.
III. General Welfare Analysis
In this section, we use the model laid out in section II to derive an explicit formula for
the welfare cost of business cycles (proposition 2). To this end, we ﬁrst discuss in part III.A
how to eliminate business cycles in economies with idiosyncratic risk following the analysis
in Krebs (2003a), Krusell and Smith (1999,2002), and Lucas (2003), and then apply the
general approach in part III.B to the current model.
III.A. How to Eliminate Business Cycles
We are interested in the change in expected lifetime utility of workers when business cycles
are eliminated. In our model, the elimination of business cycles amounts to moving from an
11economy with ﬂuctuations in the aggregate state St (the economy with business cycles) to an
economy with constant St (the economy without business cycles). For simplicity, assume that
the aggregate state process is serially uncorrelated so that π(si,t+1,S t+1|St)=π(si,t+1,S t+1).
In this case, we move from an economy with individual labor income process described by
probabilities π(si,S) and individual growth-rate realizations η = η(si,S) to an economy with
an individual labor income process described probabilities π (si) and individual growth-rate
realizations η  = η (si). The question that arises is what relationship holds between (π,η(.))
and the corresponding (π ,η (.)).
It seems natural to compute the probabilities in the economy without business cycles
as the simple marginals of the probabilities in the economy with business cycles. Using an











In short, we have the following relationship between random variables describing individual
income risk in the two economies:
η
 
i = E[ηi|si] . (11)
In words: conditional on the idiosyncratic shock, the expected value of all exogenous random
variables is the same in both economies. The procedure of integrating out aggregate states in
this way has been ﬁrst put forward by Krusell and Smith (1999). They call it the “integration
principle”, and we follow their terminology in this paper. This principle is a natural extension
of the methodology used by Lucas (1987) for representative-agent economies in the sense that
in both cases random variables are replaced by their expected value, but in (11) we use the
mean conditional on the idiosyncratic shock. Krebs (2003a), Lucas (2003), and Krusell and
13For random variables with uncountable support summation is replaced by integration.
12Smith (2002) have recently argued that this principle is intuitively convincing, and that it
imposes a useful discipline upon the analysis. Notice that for random variables that exhibit
a dependence on S, it means that the elimination of business cycles unambiguously reduces
risk. In other words, the random variables µ and η are mean-preserving spreads of the
random variables µ  and η .
III.B. A Welfare Formula
The integration principle deﬁnes how the elimination of business cycles aﬀects the labor
income process of workers. We now apply the integration principle to the model discussed
in part II, and derive an explicit formula for the welfare cost of business cycles.
Changes in the labor income process change the equilibrium consumption and welfare of
workers. We deﬁne the welfare cost of business cycles as the number ∆ that solves
E0














where cit is consumption in the economy with business cycles and c 
it is consumption in
the economy without business cycles.14 That is, we deﬁne the welfare cost of business
cycles as the percentage of lifetime consumption that workers have to receive in order to be
fully compensated for the cyclical variations in labor income risk. Using the fact that in
equilibrium individual consumption equals individual income, we ﬁnd the following welfare
expressions
E0
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(1 − γ)( 1− βE[(1 + η)1−γ])
. (13)
14Note that (12) follows the bulk of the previous literature and deﬁnes the total cost of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Alvarez and Jermann (2003) deﬁne a concept of marginal cost of business cycles by considering
small reductions in consumption ﬂuctuations.












1 − βE[(1 + η)1−γ]
1 − βE[(1 + η )1−γ]
  1
1−γ
− 1 , (14)
where the random variables η and η  have been deﬁned above. Notice that ∆ is the same
for all worker, and that the expectations is taken over idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
Note also the fact that η is a mean-preserving spread of η , which in conjunction with the
concavity of the utility function implies that ∆ ≥ 0. In other words, cyclical variations in
idiosyncratic labor income risk never decrease the welfare cost of business cycles. Finally,
note that the strict inequality holds if and only if the outcome function η = η(si,S) depends
in a non-trivial way on S. That is, we have ∆ > 0 if and only if the aggregate state aﬀects
the magnitude of income changes. We summarize the preceding discussion in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. The welfare cost of business cycles is given by (14). The welfare cost
of business cycles is non-negative, ∆ ≥ 0, and strictly positive if and only if the outcome
function η(.) depends in a non-trivial way on the aggregate state: η(si,S)  = η(si, ˆ S)f o rs o m e
si,S,ˆ S. In other words, cyclical variations in idiosyncratic labor income risk never decrease
the welfare cost of business cycles, and they increase the welfare cost of business cycles if
and only if the magnitude of idiosyncratic labor income shocks depends on the aggregate
state.
Proposition 2 makes clear why several papers in the previous literature have found small
welfare cost of business cycles. For example, the papers by Atkeson and Phelan (1994),
Imrohoroglu (1989), and Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002) all study models of worker un-
employment in which the individual income process that has a two-state support that is
14independent of the aggregate state. With the exception of Krusell and Smith (2002), all
these papers also assume that the idiosyncratic variable si is the individual employment
state itself. That is, si =0i fw o r k e ri is unemployed and si =1i fw o r k e ri is employed.
Given that in this case the outcome function η(.) does not depend on the aggregate state,
proposition 2 implies ∆ = 0, and this is exactly the result reported by Atkeson and Phelan
(1994). Krusell and Smith (1999) ﬁnd positive welfare cost of business cycles due to indirect
price eﬀects, but these eﬀects turn out to be quantitatively small as long as this approach
is taken. Imrohoroglu (1989) ﬁnds small welfare cost of business cycles not due to indirect
price eﬀects, but this eﬀect is due to the fact that her procedure of eliminating business
cycles does not satisfy the integration principle.
Notice that if we identify si with the employment state of an individual worker, then
the idiosyncratic state is necessarily correlated with the aggregate state (as long as unem-
ployment probabilities depend on the aggregate state). In order to avoid such a correlation,
Krusell and Smith (2002) introduce a new idiosyncratic variable that by deﬁnition is indepen-
dent of the aggregate state, and then deﬁne the observed employment state as a non-linear
function of this idiosyncratic variable and the aggregate state. In this case, the welfare cost
of business becomes positive (see also the appendix for details). Thus, depending on the
choice of the state space, the welfare cost might be either zero or strictly positive even if the
(marginal) process of individual labor income in the economy with business cycles is known,
a point that has also been made by Krebs (2003a) in the context of the normal-distribution
setting discussed in the next section. However, if we impose the additional assumption that
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are stochastically independent (see equation 15), then
the welfare cost of business cycles is uniquely determined as long as idiosyncratic risk is one-
dimensional.15 In contrast, once we allow for multi-dimensional idiosyncratic risk, there is a
15See section IV.A and the appendix for details. The proof of uniqueness requires in general an additional
monotonicity assumption.
15wide range of welfare cost of business cycles that is consistent with the (marginal) process of
individual labor income in the economy with business cycles. In the next section, we provide
a general characterization of this range.
IV. Multi-Dimensional Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section, we discuss the welfare cost of business cycles when there are multiple
dimensions of idiosyncratic risk and the independence assumption (15) is satisﬁed. In the
ﬁrst part (section IV.A), we parameterize idiosyncratic risk and use the parameterization
to provide a general characterization of the welfare cost of business cycles when preferences
and the marginal process of individual labor income in the economy with business cycles are
given. This analysis also shows that the introduction of multiple sources of idiosyncratic risk
never decreases the welfare cost of business cycles, and strictly increases it if there are cyclical
ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent dimensions of idiosyncratic risk. In the second part (section
IV.B), we conduct a quantitative analysis that computes the welfare cost of business cycles for
a version of the model calibrated to match U.S. labor market data. In this part, we calculate
the welfare cost of business cycles as a function of one parameter, namely the correlation
coeﬃcient between idiosyncratic labor income shocks during booms and idiosyncratic labor
income shocks during recessions. This parameter, in turn, is monotonically related to the
degree to which the relative importance of the diﬀerent dimensions of risk varies over the
business cycle. In the ﬁnal part (section IV.C), we provide some preliminary evidence that
suggesting that the U.S. labor market is characterized by substantial cyclical variations
across two particular dimensions of human capital risk.
IV.A. Qualitative Analysis
To render the analysis as transparent as possible, we assume that individual labor income
shocks ηi are normally distributed, an approach also taken in Krebs (2003a) and Storesletten
16et al. (2001).16 Empirically, this corresponds to assuming that ηi represents the permanent
component of labor income risk as estimated by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Storeslet-
ten et al. (2004). When evaluating the welfare expression (14), we use a second-order
Taylor approximation of the utility function, which combined with the normal-distribution
assumption leads to a simple and intuitive welfare formula. To check the accuracy of this
approximation for quantitative applications, in section IV.B we also compute welfare using
the exact utility function and a simple two-state approximation of the normal distribution.
Finally, the appendix contains a general discussion of the case in which ηi has a distribution
with two-state support that does not use the Taylor approximation of the utility function.
Following the previous literature, we consider the case of two aggregate shocks, S = L,H,
where S = L corresponds to the event that the economy is contracting (low level of economic
activity) and S = H that the economy is expanding (high level of economic activity). These
two aggregate states occur with probability πL, respectively πH. We also assume that the
idiosyncratic shock variable, si, has two components: si =( si1,s i2). Krebs (2003a), Krusell
and Smith (2002), and Lucas (2003) have recently argued that idiosyncratic shocks should by
deﬁnition be stochastically independent of the aggregate state (independence assumption),
and we follow their lead in this paper. More precisely, we assume that:
π(si1,s i2,S)=π(si1)π(si2)π(S) . (15)
We call (15) the independence assumption. Notice that the independence assumption (15)
ensures that the application of the integration principle (11) removes any correlation across
individual income shocks (agents). That is, in general we have corr(ηi,η j)  =0i nt h e
economy with business cycles, but we always have corr(η 
i,η 
j) = 0 in the economy without
business cycles. Thus, if (15) is satisﬁed, then the approach taken in Atkeson and Phelan
(1994), which requires that the elimination of business cycles removes any correlation across
16Storesletten et al. (2001) assume log-normally distributed income shocks.
17individual income shocks (agents), coincides with the approach proposed in Krusell and
Smith (1999), namely to use the integration principle (11).17
As mentioned before, we assume that idiosyncratic shocks are normally distributed: s1i ∼
N(0,σ2
1s)a n ds2i ∼ N(0,σ2
2s). Further, we make the assumption that individual income
shocks are a linear function of the two sources of idiosyncratic risk, where the coeﬃcients of
this linear function may depend on the aggregate state:
η(s1i,s 2i,S)=αS (ωSs1i +( 1− ωS)s2i)+g. (16)
In (16) αS are parameters that measure cyclical ﬂuctuations in total labor income risk, ωS
are parameters that measure cyclical ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent dimensions (sources)
of idiosyncratic labor income risk, and g is the (constant) growth rate of aggregate income.
Notice that if we have ωS = ω, then (16) is equivalent to the case of one-dimensional
idiosyncratic risk in the sense that income shocks and welfare only depend on ˜ si = ωs1i +
(1 − ω)s2i and S. Finally, note that we have by construction
E[η(si,S)|S]=g. (17)
Equation (17) says that there is no aggregate risk in the economy. Thus, for the economy
considered here, the welfare cost of business cycles is nil if there is no uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic risk.
Several interpretations of (16) are possible. One interpretation assumes that labor income
of worker i in period t is given by
yit = exp(r1ith1i + r2ith2i) , (18)
17Notice, however, that the examples considered in Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith
(1999) do not satisfy the independence assumption (15) since in both papers the idiosyncratic state, si,i s
identiﬁed with the employment state of an individual worker.
18where h1i and h2i are the endowments of worker i of each of the two skill-types, and r1it
and r2it are the random returns to the two skills. Equation (18) assumes that the skill
levels are constant over time and that returns to individual skills evolve stochastically, but
an alternative speciﬁcation in which skill levels are random is also possible. Notice that
the deﬁnition of labor income (18) is the typical speciﬁcation used in any Mincer-type wage
regression (Mincer, 1974), which assumes that the log-wage of an individual worker is the
sum of several components reﬂecting the return to the diﬀerent types of human capital
(education, experience, tenure). For more on this, see section IV.C.
To ensure that all workers are ex-ante identical, suppose also that their endowments of
the diﬀerent skills are identical: h1i = h1 and h2i = h2. Given the speciﬁcation (18), we have






=( r1i,t+1 − r1it)h1 +( r2i,t+1 − r2it)h2 .
Thus, if we set (r1i,t+1 − r1it)h1 = αt+1ωt+1s1i,t+1 + νg and (r2i,t+1 − r2it)h2 = αt+1(1 −










s2, where we deﬁned σ2
r1,t+1 =
var[(r1i,t+1 − r1it)|St+1]a n dσ2
r2,t+1 = var[(r2i,t+1 − r2it)|St+1] . In section IV.C we use these





Let ηiL and ηiH stand for individual income shocks when S = L, respectively S = H.
Given our speciﬁcation of the outcome function (16) and the assumption that idiosyncratic
shocks are normally distributed, s1i ∼ N(0,σ2
1s)a n ds2i ∼ N(0,σ2
2s), the two random vari-
ables ηiL and ηiH are jointly normally distributed:






















































2s +( 1− ωH)2
.
Note that to derive (20) we also used the assumption (15) that idiosyncratic shocks are
independently distributed. Empirical work on labor income risk (Meghir and Pistaferri,
2004, Storesletten, et al., 2004) provides estimates of the variances σ2
L and σ2
H, but we have
no direct estimates of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ. Thus, we can think of σ2
L and σ2
H as
being determined by the labor income data, but the correlation coeﬃcient ρ depends on
the particular nature of idiosyncratic risk. If ωL = ωH, then there are no variations in the
relative importance of the individual sources of idiosyncratic risk, and we are back to the
case of one-dimensional idiosyncratic risk in the sense that idiosyncratic labor income shocks
depend on the one-dimensional variable ˜ si = ωs1i +(1−ω)s2i. This one-dimensional case is
the one considered by the previous literature, and in our general framework it corresponds
to a correlation coeﬃcient of ρ = 1. In contrast, as long as we have cyclical variations across
dimensions of risk, ωL  = ωH, the correlation coeﬃcient is strictly less than one: ρ<1.
Finally, notice that for any income parameters (σ2
L,σ2
H,ρ), there are underlying parameters
(αL,α H,ω L,ω H,σ2
1s,σ2
2s)s ot h a t( 2 0 )i ss a t i s ﬁ e d .
Applying the integration principle (10) to the random variable (ηiL,η iH), we ﬁnd η 
i =
πLηiL + πHηiH. Thus, individual labor income risk in the economy without business cycles















Notice that for the one-dimensional case, ρ =1 ,w eh a v eσ  = πLσL + πHσH.T h a t i s ,
if idiosyncratic risk is one-dimensional, then the elimination of business cycles amounts to
replacing the two normal distributions with state-dependent standard deviations by one nor-
20mal distributions with a standard deviation that is equal to the mean of the state-dependent
standard deviations. Note further that a decrease in ρ decreases the variance of individual
labor income shocks in the economy without business cycles: dσ 2
dρ > 0. In other words, for
given labor income risk in the economy with business cycles, deﬁned by σ2
L and σ2
H, business
cycle variations across the individual sources of idiosyncratic risk reduce labor income risk
in the economy without business cycles.
To provide some intuition for this risk-reduction eﬀect, consider the special case in which
πL = πH =1 /2, αS = α, σ2
L = σ2
H = σ2, ωL =1 ,a n dωH = 0. That is, during recessions
(S = L) only skill-type 1 is useful, and during booms (S = H) only skill-type 2 is useful.
Moreover, both skill types have the same amount of idiosyncratic income risk, and total labor
income risk in the economy with business cycles is therefore constant and equal to σ2. Clearly,
any one-dimensional view of labor income risk would lead to the conclusion that the welfare
cost of business cycles is zero. However, the two-dimensional view described above suggests
that the welfare cost of business cycles is strictly positive, since the elimination of business
cycles reduces the variance of labor income risk from σ2 to σ 2 =1 /4σ2+1/4σ2 =1 /2σ2.O f
course, this is simply a standard asset diversiﬁcation result: in the economy with business
cycles, the labor income of a worker at each point in time is determined by the random
return to one asset only, whereas in the economy without business cycles, the labor income
of the same worker is determined by the simple mean return of two assets.
Returning to the general case deﬁned by (20) and (21), let us now evaluate the wel-
fare formula (14) for the log-utility case using a second-order Taylor approximation for the
functions log(1 + ηi)a n dlog(1 + η 
i) around ηi = η 


































































As discussed before, a decrease in ρ decreases σ 2. Thus, it follows from (22) and (23) that
for given σ2
L and σ2
H, a decrease in ρ increases the welfare cost of business cycles. Clearly,
the welfare cost of business cycles (22) and (23) achieves its minimum if ρ =1 ,w h i c h
corresponds to the case of one-dimensional idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the welfare cost of
business cycles (22) and (23) achieves its maximum if ρ = −1, in which case the elimination
of business cycles leads to the elimination of all income risk: σ 2 =0 .
We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the independence assumption (15) holds, that income
shocks are normally distributed, and that welfare is calculated using a second-order Taylor
approximation of utility functions. Then the welfare cost of business cycles, ∆, is given
by (22) and (23). In particular, for a given marginal process of individual labor income
in the economy with business cycles (deﬁned by σ2
L and σ2
H), the welfare cost of business
cycles is a strictly decreasing function of ρ, where the parameter ρ measures the correlation
between idiosyncratic income shocks during booms and idiosyncratic income shocks during
recessions. If ρ = 1, then there are no cyclical ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent dimensions
of idiosyncratic risk (ωL = ωH = ω), and idiosyncratic labor income risk is basically one-
dimensional. If ρ<1, then there are cyclical ﬂuctuations across the diﬀerent dimensions of
idiosyncratic risk (ωL  = ωH), and the welfare cost of business cycles is strictly larger than
the minimum that is achieved in the one-dimensional case. Finally, if ρ = −1, eliminating
business cycles amounts to eliminating all idiosyncratic risk, and the welfare cost of business
cycles is maximal.
22IV.B. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the quantitative importance of the eﬀects discussed in the
previous section. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both aggregate states are equally
likely: πL = πH = .5. We choose an annual discount factors of β = .95, which is in line with
previous work. For example, Imrohoroglu (1989) chooses β = .96, Storesletten et al. (2001)
have β = .95, and Krusell and Smith (1999,2002) assume a stochastic discount factor with a
mean of .95. At this stage, we will not try to pin down the correlation parameter ρ.T h u s ,
it remains to specify the parameters σL and σH deﬁning the marginal process of individual
labor income in the economy with business cycles.
Equation (3) shows that ηi represents permanent income shocks since labor income fol-
lows (approximately) a logarithmic random walk with innovation term equal to ηi.T h e
empirical literature on labor income risk has often used this random walk speciﬁcation for
the permanent component of labor income (Carroll and Samwick, 1997, Gourinchas and
Parker, 2002, and Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004), or has used an AR(1) speciﬁcation and then
estimated a serial correlation coeﬃcient close to one (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994,
and Storesletten et al., 2004). All these studies use annual income data drawn from the PSID
data set, and estimate an average standard deviation of permanent income shocks between
.15 and .18 for the pooled household/worker sample. This estimate of the average standard
deviation corresponds to the expression .5σL +.5σH in the theoretical model, and we choose
σL and σH so that the value of this average is equal to .15 (the lower bound of the range of
estimates).
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Storesletten et al. (2004) are the only studies estimating
cyclical variations in idiosyncratic labor income risk. More speciﬁcally, Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) estimate σt for each year t (see their table A4). After applying the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter to their time-series estimates of σt, we ﬁnd that the standard deviation of the cyclical
23component of σt is equal to .035. Storesletten et al. (2004) restrict σt to take on two values,
and estimate σL = .21 and σH = .12, which corresponds to a standard deviation of .045
when both states are equally likely: πL = πH = .5. We choose values of σL and σH so that
the implied standard deviation of σ(S)i se q u a lt o.03, which is clearly a conservative value
for the degree of cyclical variations in income risk. In short, we require:
.5σL + .5σH = .15 (24)
 
.5(σL − .15)2 + .5(σH − .15)2 = .03
The restrictions (24) translate into the values σL = .18 and σH = .12.
Choosing σηL = .18 and σηH = .12 for labor income risk and using the formula (22) and
(23) to calculate the welfare cost of business cycles is likely to overestimate these welfare costs
for the following reason. In the model, households do not hold capital (ﬁnancial wealth) and
labor income shocks are permanent, which implies that the volatility of individual consump-
tion growth, which is the main determinant of welfare, is equal to the volatility of individual
labor income growth, ση. Krebs (2003a,b) considers a model with permanent labor income
shocks in which households hold a positive amount of capital. He shows that (with log-
utility) the volatility of individual consumption growth is equal to β2(α2σ2
k +( 1− α)2σ2
h),
where α is the fraction of income that is capital income, σ2
k is the variance of changes in capi-
tal income, and σ2
h is the variance of the change in labor income. If we assume a capital share
of α = .67, a discount factor of β = .95, and risk-free capital, σ2
k = 0, then this suggests that
we multiply our estimates of labor income risk by .63 when using the formula (22) and (23).
This suggests to use as a benchmark model σL = .63∗.18 = .1134 and σH = .63∗.12 = .0756
resulting in a mean of σ(S)o f.0945 and a standard deviation of σ(S)o f.019.18
18For log-utility preferences, the implied price of a risk-free, one period bond is Qf = βE[(1 + ηi)−1].
Using an aggregate growth rate of g = .02 and a second-order Taylor approximation of (1 + ηi)−1 around
ηi = 0, we ﬁnd an implied annual interest rate of 6.87%. In comparison, the corresponding complete-market
economy would imply an annual interest rate of 7%. Notice also that the implied average consumption
24The solid line in ﬁgure 1 shows the welfare cost of business cycles for diﬀerent values
of ρ using the formula (22) (quadratic approximation of log-utility preferences) and the
benchmark choice of σL = .1134 and σH = .0756. The dotted line in ﬁgure 1 shows the results
when the normal distribution is approximated by a two-state distribution using the exact
welfare formula (14). Notice ﬁrst that the two lines are very close together, which suggests
that the second-order Taylor approximation of the welfare formula (14) is quite accurate.
More importantly, we notice that the welfare cost of business cycles is very sensitive to
relatively small changes in ρ. For example, if ρ = 1 (the one-dimensional case), then ∆ is
equal to .34 percent of lifetime consumption, but if ρ = .66 the welfare cost of business cycles
increases to 1.78 percent of lifetime consumption. A value of ρ = .66 could result if ωL = .67,
ωH = .21, and σ1s = σ2s (see equation 20), and in section IV.C we will argue that this degree
of cyclical variation in ω is quite realistic using estimates of U.S.labor market risk and a
particular interpretation of the two dimensions of human capital risk. However, even if we
choose a more moderate degree of variation in ω, for example ω = .59 and ω = .30, we still
ﬁnd a correlation coeﬃcient that results in a welfare cost of business cycles that is substantial,
namely one percent of lifetime consumption. Finally, we note that if ρ = −1, then eliminating
business cycles amounts to eliminating all idiosyncratic labor income risk, and the welfare
cost of business cycles becomes 8.86 percent of lifetime consumption. To summarize, realistic
variations across the individual sources of idiosyncratic risk have substantial eﬀects on the
welfare cost of business cycles, and in principle such variations across dimensions of risk
could increase the welfare cost of business cycles tremendously.19
volatility is equal to the income volatility, which has an annual standard deviation of .0945. Using the CEX
data set, Brav et al. (2002) estimate an average individual consumption volatility that is somewhat larger.
Attanasio (1999) argues that the consumption volatility is signiﬁcantly smaller, but his conclusion is based
on synthetic panel data sets ruling out by assumption truly idiosyncratic shocks to consumption.
19Figure 1 also shows that the welfare cost of business cycles is almost linear in ρ, which is not surprising
given that formula (22) implies this linearity as long as ln(1 + x) ≈ x is a good approximation.
25To compare our results with the case of complete markets (representative-agent economy),
notice that in the current economy the welfare cost of business cycles is zero if markets
are complete since there are no cyclical variations in aggregate income. If we introduce
cyclical variations in aggregate income, then for the same preferences the welfare cost of
business cycles increases to .05% of lifetime consumption (Lucas, 1987). Thus, introducing
idiosyncratic risk into the analysis increases the welfare cost of business cycles signiﬁcantly
even in the one-dimensional case (from .05% to .34%), but introducing idiosyncratic risk
with multiple dimensions has the potential to increase the welfare cost by a much larger
amount (welfare costs around 1.5% are likely and 8.86% is the upper bound).
Figure 2 shows the welfare cost of business cycles for diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion
using the second-order Taylor approximation implicit in formula (23). More speciﬁcally, we
choose γ = .5, γ = 1 (log-utility), and γ =1 .5. Notice ﬁrst that an increase in the degree of
risk aversion from γ = .5t oγ = 1 roughly doubles the welfare cost of business cycles. For
example, if ρ =1t h e n∆=.17% for risk aversion of γ = .5a n d∆=.34 for risk aversion of
γ =1 .I fρ = .66, then ∆ = .87% for a risk aversion parameter of γ = .5a n d∆=1 .78% for
a risk aversion parameter of γ = 1. Second, increasing the degree of risk aversion from γ =1
to γ =1 .5 roughly increases the welfare cost of business cycles by 50 percent. For example,
if ρ =1t h e n∆=.55 for a risk aversion parameter of γ =1a n di fρ = .66 the welfare cost
becomes ∆ = 2.85% (as opposed to ∆ = .34%, respectively ∆ = 1.78% if γ =1 ) .
Figure 3 reports the welfare cost of business cycles when there are no cyclical variations
in total labor income risk: σηL = σηH = .0935. In this case, the welfare cost of business
cycles is nil, ∆ = 0, if ρη = 1 (the one-dimensional case). However, even though there
are no cyclical variations in total labor income risk, there can still be cyclical variations
across dimensions of risk, and this will lead to positive welfare cost of business cycles. For
example, if ρ = .66, the welfare cost is 1.45% percent of lifetime consumption with log-utility
26preferences. Thus, even if the one-dimensional analysis suggests no welfare cost of business
cycles, a multi-dimensional view of labor income risk implies a substantial welfare cost of
business cycles.
Finally, ﬁgure 4 shows the welfare cost of business cycles as a function of ρ when σL = .18
and σH = .12, that is, when we do not make the adjustment that accounts for the fact that,
contrary to the model, workers do owns some capital. In this case, the general points made
before still hold, but overall the welfare cost of business cycles is substantially larger. For
example, with log-utility preferences, the one-dimensional case (ρ =1 )l e a d st o∆=.86%,
and for a correlation coeﬃcient of ρ = .66 we ﬁnd ∆ = 4.44%.20
IV.C. Some Preliminary Evidence on ρ
In this section, we provide some preliminary evidence regarding the degree to which the
U.S. labor market exhibits cyclical variations across two particular dimensions of idiosyn-
cratic labor income risk yielding an estimate of the parameter ρ. It is worth pointing out
that the evidence presented in this section is highly tentative, and that the resulting estimate
of ρ is subject to a wide margin of error.
As in equation (18), suppose that total human capital of a worker is composed of two
types of human capital, and that the income of each worker is the sum of the returns to the
two diﬀerent types of human capital. In contrast to the previous section, however, assume
now that there are two groups of workers, one group that is only endowed with the ﬁrst
type of human capital (group 1) and one group that is only endowed with the second type of
human capital (group 2). Denote by σ2
1η, respectively σ2
2η, the variance of the (permanent)
income changes of group 1, respectively group 2. Using equation (16) and the assumptions
20For log-utility preferences, the implied annual interest rate becomes now 6.12% (using again g = .02 and
a second-order Taylor approximation).
27made so far, we ﬁnd
σ1ηt = αtωtσ1s (25)
σ2ηt = αt(1 − ωt)σ2s .







Thus, given estimates of σ1ηt and σ2ηt, we can use (26) to back out estimates of ωt,t h e
parameter measuring the extent to which the relative importance of the two dimensions
of idiosyncratic human capital risk varies of the cycle. Estimates of ωt, in turn, allow us
to estimate the correlation coeﬃcient ρ, which is the main parameter of interest. We now
present one application of this approach.
Suppose we identify the ﬁrst type of human capital with speciﬁc human capital and
the second type of human capital with general human capital. In order to use (26), we
would need to estimate σηt for two groups of workers, one group of workers with no speciﬁc
human capital but some general human capital, and another group of workers with some
speciﬁc human capital but no general human capital. Suppose, for example, that we proxy
speciﬁc human capital by tenure at a ﬁrm and general human capital by education, and that
we make the additional assumption that workers with (almost) no tenure have no speciﬁc
human capital and workers with the lowest level of education have no general human capital.
In this case, estimates of σ2
ηt for the two groups of workers (group 1 with no education but
some tenure and group 2 with no tenure but some education) allow us to use equation (26).
Unfortunately, such estimates do no yet exists in the empirical labor literature, but there
is something that at least comes close to it, namely the estimates reported in Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004).
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) estimate the variance of permanent changes in individual
28income, σ2
ηt, for three diﬀerent groups of workers: low level of education (high-school drop-
outs), medium level of education (high school graduates), and high level of education (college
graduates). If, as before, we identify education with general human capital, and if we also
assume that high-school drop-outs have no endowment of general human capital, then we
can identify the group of high-school drop-outs with group 1. Thus, the estimates of the
variance of the permanent component of labor income risk obtained for the group of high-
school drop-outs by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) can be identiﬁed with estimates of σ2
1ηt in
(26). As a second reference group, we pick workers with at least a college degree (highest
level of education), and assume that these workers have no speciﬁc human capital.21 In this
case, we can identify the group of college graduates with group 2, and the estimates of the
variance of the permanent component of labor income risk obtained for this group can be
identiﬁed with estimates of σ2
2ηt in (26). In short, this particular interpretation provide us
with estimates of σ2
1ηt and σ2
2ηt that can be used to back out ωt in (26).
We use the estimates of ωt thus obtained to ﬁnd values for ωL and ωH as follows. We
ﬁrst calculate the sample mean of the time series estimates of ωt yielding 1
T
 
t ωt = .44. We
then apply the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to the time series of ωt and calculate the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of ωt, which yields .23. Finally, we choose ωL and ωH so
that the random variable ω has a mean equal to .44 and a standard deviation equal to .23.















2 = .23 .
Equation (27) leads to ωL = .21 and ωH = .67. These estimates are then substituted into
(20) in order to ﬁnd ρ (using again σ1s = σ2s). This yields ρ = .66, which is the value of ρ
21Of course, this assumption is an extreme version of the somewhat more moderate assumption that most
of the human capital of college-educated workers is general human capital.
29considered “realistic” in the discussion in section IV.B.22
At this stage, it seems worth pointing out two implications of the speciﬁc approach taken
in this section that are supported by the data, which provides indirect evidence in favor of
the assumptions made so far. First, given that high-school drop-outs have no general human
capital and college graduates have no speciﬁc human capital, it must be true that workers in
the “middle-group”, namely those workers with only a high-school education, are endowed
with both general and speciﬁc human capital. Thus, income for this group of workers is
the sum of the return to two types of human capital, whereas income of workers belonging
to the other two groups is the return to only one type of human capital. This, in turn,
suggests that total labor income risk for workers with high-shool education is smaller than
for workers with either no high-school education or college education since the high-school
educated workers have a more diversiﬁed portfolio. Indeed, using the estimates of Meghir





ηt,i se q u a lt o.0297 for high-school-educated workers, but equal to .0389, respectively
.0423, for high-school drop-outs, respectively college-educated workers.
A second implication of our approach is that labor income risk of high-school drop-out
and labor income risk of college-educated workers should behave diﬀerently over the business
cycle. Indeed, it turns out that the correlation between the cyclical component of σ2
1ηt (labor
income risk of high-school drop-outs) and σ2
2ηt (labor income risk of college-educated workers)
is negative (correlation coeﬃcient of −.24). Notice that the one-dimensional approach to
labor income and labor income risk would predict a correlation coeﬃcient of +1. Moreover,
the correlation coeﬃcient between the cyclical components of σ2
1ηt and real (annual) GDP
22Clearly, to the extent that σ2
ηt is estimated with error, this procedure overestimates the degree of varia-
tions in ωt, and therefore underestimates ρ. Note, however, that a similar criticism applies to Krebs (2003a)
and Storesletten et al. (2001) when they discuss the welfare cost of business cycles due to cyclical variations
in (one-dimensional) labor income risk since neither papers makes an adjustment for the fact that the values
of σ2
η are estimated with error.
30is −.10, whereas the correlation coeﬃcient between the cyclical components of σ2
2ηt and real
(annual) GDP is +.31. That is, for high-school drop outs the variance of permanent income
changes goes up when economic growth is sluggish, whereas for college-educated workers
this variance increases during economic booms.23 Thus, the labor income risk of these two
groups of workers, which by assumption are equipped with very diﬀerent types of human
capital, exhibit very diﬀerent patterns over the business cycle, which according to the current
interpretation is the result of cyclical variations across the two dimensions of human capital
risk.
Finally, let us note that the welfare cost of business cycles calculated in section IV.B
using ρ = .66 (as opposed to ρ = 1) does not apply to workers with no high-school education
(group 1) or college education (group 2) since we have assumed that workers belonging to
either one of these two groups are only endowed with one type of human capital. In other
words, these workers will not reap the additional beneﬁts that come from the elimination of
cyclical variations across diﬀerent dimensions of human capital risk since we have assumed
that their human capital endowment, and therefore their human capital risk, is always one-
dimensional. However, the middle-group of workers with only high-school education is truly
two-dimensional, and will therefore gain from the elimination of cyclical variations across
the two dimensions of human capital risk. Thus, using the particular interpretation of multi-
dimensional risk put forward in this section, the welfare cost of business cycles calculated
in section IV.B using ρ = .66 would only apply to workers belonging to the middle-group
(high-school education only).
23Although the positive correlation between income variance and economic growth for college-educated
workers seems somewhat counter-intuitive, it could be explained by the fact that positive income “shocks”
become more likely and larger during booms, and that this eﬀect is more pronounced for college-educated
workers.
31V. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the welfare costs of business cycles when workers face uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor income risk. In contrast to the previous literature, this paper introduced
multiple sources of idiosyncratic labor market risk, and used this approach to provide a
general characterization of the welfare cost of business cycles when preferences and the
marginal process of individual labor income in the economy with business cycles are given.
The general analysis showed that the introduction of multiple sources of idiosyncratic risk
never decreases the welfare cost of business cycles, and strictly increases it if there are
cyclical variations across the diﬀerent sources of risk. A quantitative analysis based on a
calibrated version of the model showed that the welfare cost of business cycles due multi-
dimensional idiosyncratic risk is likely to be substantial. More speciﬁcally, depending on the
magnitude of cyclical variations across diﬀerent dimensions of idiosyncratic labor income risk,
the welfare cost of business cycles could be anything between 0.3 (the one-dimensional case)
and 9 percent of lifetime consumption (for log-utility preferences). Moreover, for “realistic”
cyclical variations across dimensions of labor market risk, the welfare cost of business cycles
is 1.5% of lifetime consumption.
Clearly, the last result of welfare cost of business cycles of 1.5% of lifetime consumption
is highly tentative in the sense that it relies on very preliminary evidence on the magnitude
of cyclical variations across diﬀerent dimensions of idiosyncratic labor income risk. In other
words, in order to arrive at ﬁrm conclusions, much more empirical work is needed that
identiﬁes particular dimensions of human capital risk and then estimates the magnitude of
variations across the individual dimensions over the business cycle. However, even though
this paper does not provide ﬁnal answers, it does point towards an important new channel
through which idiosyncratic risk aﬀects the welfare cost of business cycles, and it provides
a simple framework that can be used to translate (future) empirical results about cyclical
32variations across dimensions of labor market risk into precise statements about the welfare
cost of business cycles.
33Appendix: Job Displacement
Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Imrohoroglu (1989), and Krusell and Smith (1999, 2002)
study a model with an individual income process that is Markov and has a two-state support.
Their interpretation of the low-income realization is that the worker is unemployed. In this
appendix, we consider a model that is similar in the sense that there are only two possible
realizations of η, namely 0 and −¯ η. We interpret the event ηi = −¯ η as job displacement
(low income level) and the event ηi = 0 as no job displacement (high income level). Clearly,
an important diﬀerence between the previous literature and the current model is that the
previous literature has emphasized the (temporary) income losses during the unemployment
period, whereas the current paper focuses on the (permanent) loss of income that persists
even after the displaced worker has found a new job. However, for the main issue analyzed
in this paper, namely the eﬀect of multiple sources of idiosyncratic risk on the welfare cost
of business cycles, this diﬀerence does not seem to be of ﬁrst-order importance.
As in section IV, we assume that there are two aggregate states, S = L,H, that occur
with probability πL, respectively πH. We also assume that the idiosyncratic shock vari-
able, si, has two components: si =( si1,s i2), and that the independence assumption holds:
π(si1,s i2,S)=π(si1)π(si2)π(S). Finally, we also make the assumption that idiosyncratic
shocks are normally distributed: s1i ∼ N(0,σ2
1s)a n ds2i ∼ N(0,σ2
2s).
Deﬁne the following function:
f(s1i,s 2i,S)=αS (ωSs1i +( 1− ωS)s2i) . (28)
Given the assumptions made so far, the random variables fiL and fiH are jointly normally
distributed, (fiL,f iH) ∼ N(0,0,σ2
L,σ2
H,ρ), where the parameters σ2
L, σ2
H,a n dρ are deﬁned
as in (20), and the choice ρ = 1 again corresponds to the one-dimensional case. In contrast
34to section IV, however, we do not identify the outcome function η(.)w i t hf(.), but assume
η(s1i,s 2i,S)=
 
−¯ ηi f f (s1i,s 2i,S) ≤ cS
0 if f(s1i,s 2i,S) >c S , (29)
where cL and cH are two real numbers. Notice that even though f(.) is a linear function in
s1i and s2i, the outcome function η(.) is not. One interpretation of this outcome function is
that worker i becomes displaced once the productivity drops below the threshold value cS.
Notice that for any S, the outcome function is monotone in s1i and s2i, something we would
expect to hold for most optimal decision rules.
Denote the probability of job displacement in state S by pS. Given our speciﬁcation of
the outcome function, we have:
prob(fiL ≤ cH)=pH (30)
prob(fiH ≤ cL)=pL .
Clearly, we can always ﬁnd values of σ2
L, σ2
H, cL,a n dcH so that (30) holds. Notice also that
the correlation coeﬃcient ρ can be varied without changing the displacement probabilities
pL and pH. We will now show how a decrease in ρ increases the welfare cost of business
cycles.
The application of the integration principle yields a new labor income process deﬁned by




   
   
η 
1 if f(s1i,s 2i,L) ≤ cL and f(s1i,s 2i,H) ≤ cH
η 
2 if f(s1i,s 2i,L) >c L and f(s1i,s 2i,H) ≤ cH
η 
3 if f(s1i,s 2i,L) ≤ cL and f(s1i,s 2i,H) >c H
η 
4 if f(s1i,s 2i,L) >c L and f(s1i,s 2i,H) >c H
where the realizations of the new random variable η  are
η
 
1 = πL ∗ (−¯ η)+πH ∗ (−¯ η)=−¯ η
η
 
2 = πL ∗ 0+πH(−¯ η)=−πH¯ η
35η
 
3 = πL ∗ (−¯ η)+πH ∗ 0=−πL¯ η
η
 
4 = πL ∗ 0+πH ∗ 0=0 .




4}, of the random variable η  does not depend
on the structure of the state space. More speciﬁcally, changes in σ2
1s, σ2
2s,a n dαS,w h i c h
correspond to changes in σ2
L, σ2





random variable η 
i. However, these variations do change the probabilities with which the
individual realizations of η 
i occur, which in turn changes the welfare cost of business cycles.




















4)=prob(fiL >c L and fiH >c H)=q4 =1− q1 − q2 − q3 .
Notice that the above construction partitions the idiosyncratic state space into four regions.
The parameter q1 is the probability that the worker is displaced regardless of the aggregate
state, q2 is the probability that the worker is displaced during a boom but not during a
recession, q3 is the probability that the worker is displaced during a recession but not during
ab o o m ,a n dq4 is the probability that the worker is not displaced regardless of the aggregate
state.
Given the above outcome function η(.), we have the following relationship between the
probabilities q1, q2,a n dq3 and the observed displacement probabilities pL and pH:
pH = q1 + q2 (32)
pL = q1 + q3 ,
For given pL and pH, this imposes two equality restrictions on the three probabilities q1, q2,
and q3. We also have the equality restrictions 1−p(H)=q2+q4 and 1−p(L)=q3+q4, but
36these restrictions automatically hold if p(H)=q1 + q2 and p(L)=q1 + q3. Put diﬀerently,
(32) is an exhaustive representation of all linearly independent equality restrictions. Thus,
we can freely choose q1, and then pick the remaining probabilities q2 and q3 so as to match
the observed displacement probabilities p(L)a n dp(H) in the sense that (32) is satisﬁed.
Clearly, when varying q1, we have to satisfy additional inequality restrictions since prob-
abilities have to lie in [0,1]. Thus, we need 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1. Moreover, the conditions q2 ≥ 0
and pH ≥ 0i m p l yq1 ≤ pH, and the conditions q3 ≥ 0a n dpL ≥ 0i m p l yq1 ≤ pL. Finally,
q4 =1− q1 − q2 − q3 ≥ 0 implies q1 ≥ pL + pH − 1. If we assume pL >p H (displacement
probabilities increase during economic contractions) and pL + pH ≤ 1 (average displace-
ment probabilities are less than 1/2), then all the inequalities taken together result in the
restriction q1 [0,p H].
Notice also that for ﬁxed σ2
L, σ2
H, cL,a n dcH, any choice of q1 correspond to a particular
value of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ,s ot h a tw ec a nw r i t eq1 = q1(ρ). If ρ =1 ,w eh a v e
q1 = pH, the maximum value the free parameter q1 can take on and still be consistent with
the data. If ρ = −1, we have q = 0, the minimum value the free parameter q1 can take and
still be consistent with the data. Finally, it follows from the properties of joint-normally
distributed random variables that q1 is monotonically increasing in ρ:
dq1
dρ > 0.
To save space, assume now that the utility function is of the logarithmic type. If we apply
the general welfare formula (14) to this case taking into account the previous discussion, then








x = q1(ρ)log(1 − ¯ η)+( pH − q1(ρ))log(1 − πH¯ η)+( pL − q1(ρ))log(1 − πL¯ η)
− ((πLpL + πHpH)log(1 − ¯ η))) .
Equation (33) deﬁnes a linear function ∆ = ∆(ρ). It immediately follows from (33) that




=( log(1 − ¯ η) − log(1 − πH¯ η) − log(1 − πL¯ η))
dq1
dρ
< 0 . (34)
Equation (34) in conjunction with ρ [−1,1] implies that the minimum cost of business cycles
is achieved at ρ = +1. Since ρ = +1 is the one-dimensional case, we have shown that the
introduction of additional sources of idiosyncratic risk increases the welfare costs of business
cycles. Thus, from a qualitative point of view, the results obtained in this appendix are
identical to the results obtained in section IV, with the only diﬀerence that the maximum
welfare cost of business cycles, which is again achieved when ρ = −1, is in general not equal
to the welfare cost of all idiosyncratic risk (see equation 33). In summary, we have the
following version of proposition 3:
Proposition 3’. Suppose that idiosyncratic risk is deﬁned by (28) and (29). Then the
welfare cost of business cycles, ∆, is given by (33). In particular, for a given marginal process
of individual labor income in the economy with business cycles deﬁned by σ2
L and σ2
H,t h e
welfare cost of business cycles is a strictly decreasing function of ρ, where the parameter ρ
measures the correlation between idiosyncratic productivity shocks during booms and idio-
syncratic productivity shocks during recessions. If ρ = 1, then there are no cyclical variations
across the diﬀerent dimensions of idiosyncratic risk (ωL = ωH = ω), and idiosyncratic labor
income risk is basically one-dimensional. If ρ<1, then there are cyclical variations across
the diﬀerent dimensions of idiosyncratic risk (ωL  = ωH), and the welfare cost of business
cycles is strictly larger than the minimum that is achieved in the one-dimensional case.
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